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EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTION (ESF) #13-3
TERRORISM

</div>

I. PURPOSE

The purpose of this annex is to establish a unified approach for emergency response agencies of Pacific to respond to and recover from a threat or act of terrorism. It is also necessary to establish a terrorism response system that prescribes responsibilities and actions required to respond to and recover from a terrorist event.

II. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS

A. Situation:

1. Pacific has potential targets for terrorist activities. These include, but are not limited to:

    a. Municipal government facilities and structures.

    b. HAZMAT facilities.

    c. Educational facilities.

    d. Religious facilities.

    e. Businesses and manufacturing centers.

    f. Railroads, highways and navigable rivers.

    g. Pipelines; public utilities; landmarks; and large public gatherings.

2. Terrorism takes many forms; bombings, arson, infrastructure attacks (on water, electric, gas, or telecommunications systems), mass shootings, cyberspace failure or disruption, and transportation attacks (hijacking, bombing, sabotage).

    a. **Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD):** Any weapon designed or intended to cause death or serious bodily injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals, or their precursors; any weapon involving a disease organism; or any weapon designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life (18 USC 2332a). The USC (18 USC 921) also includes a destructive device, with certain exceptions, to mean "any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas, bomb, grenade, or rocket, missile, mine or a device similar to the above that will expel a projectile by explosive or other propellant".

    b. **Chemical Agent:** A chemical substance intended to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate people through physiological effects. Hazardous chemicals, including industrial chemicals and agents, can be introduced via aerosol generators), breaking containers, or covert dissemination. A chemical agent attack might release a chemical warfare agent (such as a nerve or blister agent) or an industrial chemical that may have serious consequences. Whether an

infectious agent or a hazardous chemical causes an outbreak may not be obvious early in an investigation; however, most chemical attacks are localized, and their effects become evident within a few minutes. Different chemical agents can be persistent or non-persistent. Persistent agents remain in the affected area for hours, days, or weeks. Non-persistent agents have high evaporation rates , are lighter than air, and disperse rapidly; they therefore lose ability to cause casualties after a few minutes (although they may persist longer in small unventilated areas).

c. **Biological Agents:** Living organisms or materials derived from them that cause disease; harm humans, animals, or plants; or deteriorate materials. Recognition of a biological hazard can occur by: identifying it as credible threat; discovering bioterrorism evidence (devices, agents, clandestine labs); diagnosing a disease cause by an agent identified as a possible bioterrorism agent; or gathering and interpreting public health surveillance data. People exposed to a pathogen such as anthrax or smallpox may not know they have exposed, and those infected or subsequently infected may not feel sick for some time. Infectious diseases typically progress with a delay between exposure and onset of illness – the incubations period. The incubation period may range from several hours to a few weeks, depending on the exposure and pathogen. Unlike acute incidents involving explosives or some hazardous chemicals, direct patient care providers and the public health community are likely to first detect a biological attack on civilians. Terrorists also could use biological agents to affect agricultural commodities (agro-terrorism). These agents include wheat rust or viruses that could devastate the local or even national economy.

d. **Radiological/Nuclear:** High-energy particles or gamma rays emitted by an atom undergoing radioactive decay. Emitted particles can be charged alpha or beta particles, or neutral neutrons, or gamma rays. The difficulty of responding to a nuclear or radiological incident is compounded by the nature of radiation itself. Also, involvement of radioactive materials in an explosion may or may not be obvious; depending on what explosive device was used. The presence of a radiation hazard is difficult to ascertain unless the responders have the proper detection equipment and training to use it. Most of the many detection devices available are designed to detect specific types and levels of radiation – they are not appropriate for measuring or ruling out the presence of all possible radiological hazards. Terrorists my use the following delivery methods:

(1) An improvised nuclear device (IND) is any explosive device designed to cause a nuclear yield. Either uranium or plutonium isotopes can fuel these devices, depending on the trigger. While "weapons-grade" material increases the efficiency of a device, materials of less than weapons grade can still be used.

(2) A radiological dispersal device (RDD) is any explosive device that spreads radioactive material when detonated. A RDD includes an improvised explosive device that could be used by placing it in close proximity to radioactive material. A RDD also includes devices identified as "dirty bombs".

(3) A simple RDD spreads radiological material non-explosively (for example, medical isotopes or waste).

e. **Explosives:** Conventional explosive devices or improvised bombs used to cause massive local destruction or to disperse chemical, biological, or radiological agents. Improvised explosive devices are categorized as explosive or incendiary – using high or low filler explosive materials to explode and/or cause fires. Bombs and firebombs are inexpensive and easily constructed. They are not technologically sophisticated. Of all weapons, these are the easiest to obtain and use. the components are readily available, as are detailed instructions for constructing these devices. They are the likeliest terrorist weapons.

f. **Cyber Terrorism:** "Malicious conduct in cyberspace to commit or threaten to commit acts dangerous to human life, or against a nation's critical infrastructures…in order to intimidate or coerce a government or civilian population…in furtherance of political or social objectives."

3. **Homeland Security Response Teams:** SEMA Homeland Security Response Teams Map shows the locations of existing or proposed Homeland Security Response Teams for the State of Missouri. Several of these teams include hazardous materials response teams with enhanced capabilities for response to WMD incidents, including incidents involving nuclear or radiological materials, and biological and chemical agents. The following provides a general overview of their locations, number of teams and capabilities.

a. There are Homeland Security Response Teams (HSRT) located throughout the State of Missouri.

b. Many of the existing teams are continuing to develop their heavy and light search and rescue capabilities, acquire latest technology detection equipment, expand decontamination capability, and address logistical support requirements and issues.

c. For all terrorist response operations, the Unified Command System will be used for Direction and Control.

4. Request for HSRT:

a. In order to deal with a terrorist event, a network of resources must already be in place (Personnel, equipment and supplies). The current situation will determine the type of resources needed and techniques to be employed. A

rural county may have fewer trained personnel and equipment compared to an urban area.

  b. HRST's are an asset of the State of Missouri. These teams will be mobilized and deployed by SEMA to support local jurisdiction response and recovery operations.

  c. Local jurisdictions must request support from SEMA. Call the SEMA Duty Officer at (573) 751-2748 (Day/Night) to report or request assistance.

  d. If a terrorist attack should occur in Pacific, a HRST attached to MSHP Troop C, will be responsible for responding to the terrorism incident, if available. This HSRT could be supported by other HSRT's and Forward Regional Response Teams (FRRT). It is the responsibility of the local jurisdiction to contact SEMA and request support.

B. Assumptions:

1. Pacific recognizes the responsibility for public health and safety, and the need of a plan to set forth guidelines to deal with terrorism, and the need to exercise the procedures, policies, and guidelines set forth in this Annex.

2. Proper implementation of this Annex can reduce the effects of a Terrorist attack and limit related exposure to the public.

3. No single agency at the local, state or federal level possesses the authority and/or the expertise to act unilaterally on the many difficult issues that may arise in response to a threat or act of terrorism, particularly if WMD are involved.

4. Should a terrorist incident be identified, Pacific could be acting alone pending mobilization and deployment of other local, State and Federal assets.

5. An act of terrorism involving WMD in Pacific could immediately overwhelm the local response capabilities.

6. Counter terrorism efforts including intelligence gathering and appropriate response training may reduce some incident potential, but incidents can occur with little or no warning.

7. If appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) is not readily available, entry into the contaminated area (hot zone) may be delayed until the arrival of trained and equipped emergency response personnel. Responders must also be aware of secondary devices targeting first responders.

8. The policies set forth in this Annex, and any and all plans developed by or for Pacific to mitigate, prepare for, respond to, or recover from any terrorist event, have been coordinated to eliminate dual tasking of resources and identify the proper command and control functions.

III. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

A. General:

1. Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39) was signed in May 1995, shortly after the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building bombing. PDD-39 establishes policy to reduce the United States' vulnerability to terrorism, deter and respond to terrorism, and strengthen capabilities to detect, prevent, defeat, and manage the consequences of terrorism. This directive is particularly important for planning purposes – it specifies how to manage response to and recovery from a terrorist incident.

2. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5) was signed on February 28, 2003, calling for creating of a National Response Plan (NRP) to "integrate Federal Government domestic prevention, preparedness, response and recovery plans into one all-discipline, all-hazard plan" under authority of the Secretary of Homeland Security. Under the NRP, a National Incident Management System (NIMS) is to be developed to provide a consistent nationwide framework for standardizing incident management practices and procedures. This ensures that federal, state and local governments can work effectively, efficiently, and cooperatively to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents – regardless of cause, size, or complexity.

3. The Federal government has primary responsibility to prevent, preempt, and terminate threats or acts of terrorism, and to apprehend and prosecute the perpetrators. Federal, State and local authorities will coordinate terrorism response and recovery efforts using the Incident Management System (IMS). The initial response to a terrorist incident is primarily a local law enforcement effort with the FBI assigned as the lead Federal Agency (LFA) responsible for coordinating the Federal response. The FBI will assign a Special Agent or member of the Joint Terrorism Task Force in the role of liaison to coordinate with the incident commander or unified command in an incident command post. The initial response to a terrorist incident identifies, acquires, and plans use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism. Following the initial response to the terrorist incident, recovery efforts protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the terrorist incident, **FEMA is the lead Federal Agency responsible for the recovery phase.**

4. Upon authorization by SEMA, the HSRT will be able to respond to any terrorism incident that will occur in their region and will be funded/supplied through State and Federal aid/grants. This includes the necessary equipment as well as the training to fulfill any need of the terrorist incident. See Appendix 1 for locations HSRT.

5. Upon authorization by SEMA, the FRRT will also be able to respond to terrorism incidents, but their resources will be less than those of an HSRT. They will also be funded/supplied by State and Federal aid/grants and will provide support to the HSRT in terrorism incidents when needed.

B.   Primary Objectives in Response to a Terrorist Act:

1.   Protect the lives and safety of the citizens and first responders.

2.   Isolate, contain, and/or limit the spread of any cyber, nuclear, biological, chemical, incendiary, or explosive device.

3.   Identify the type of agent or devices used.

4.   Identify and establish control zones for suspected agent used.

5.   Identify appropriate decontamination procedure and/or treatment.

6.   Ensure that responders have appropriate equipment and personal protective equipment (PPE).

7.   Notify emergency personnel, including medical facilities of the danger and anticipated casualties.

8.   Notify appropriate state and federal agencies.

9.   Provide accurate and timely public information.

10. Preserve as much evidence as possible to aid investigations.

11. Protect critical infrastructure.

C.   Operational Time Frames:

1.   Mitigation:

a.   Develop a method for processing information.

b.   Analyze potential threats, targets, and potential hazards for the jurisdiction. Disseminate on a need-to-know basis when appropriate.

c.   Identify facilities, agencies, personnel, and resources necessary to support a Terrorist Incident Response.

d.   Integrate Response on all terrorism training exercises.

e.   Review and become familiar with the State Emergency Operations Plan.

2.   Preparedness: Pacific will take the appropriate security measures (See Appendix of this Annex for Federal and State Homeland Security Advisory System threat guidelines.)

a.   Develop and review Plans and SOG's for response to a terrorist incident. Open and prepare the EOC for possible full activation.

b.   Advise key personnel of the potential risk.

c.   Make a recommendation as to a possible course of action.

d. Maintain increased readiness status until the situation escalates or the decision to discontinue operations is given. Train personnel and maintain inventory of equipment and supplies.

e. Whenever possible, training exercises conducted by local jurisdictions should include terrorism (WMD) and the use of the HSRT. The purpose is to provide a training opportunity, and to exercise HSRT capabilities as required by the Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP).

3. Response:

a. Any individual who receives notification of a terrorist incident or who is responsible for making notifications must assure that every effort is made to contact primary and support personnel as identified in the Basic Plan and to immediately notify SEMA.

b. Once a terrorism incident is suspected, local law enforcement will report and request assistance from the state using existing operating guidelines and/or procedures.

c. Each Emergency Response agency shall report to the EOC upon arrival and may be required to provide a representative to the on-scene Unified Command.

d. Local government departments will provide assistance to the EOC as dictated by the current situation.

e. Designated local jurisdiction Public Information Officer (PIO) will coordinate all public information releases (See Annex C).

4. Recovery:

a. Determine the extent of damages, prepare a damage assessment report and request assistance.

b. Test, check, and exercise equipment to identify its serviceability.

c. Restore essential public services to critical facilities.

d. Inventory and replace supplies as necessary.

e. Restore all public service to the general population.

IV. ORGANIZATION AND ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES

A. Organization:

A response organization for a terrorism incident will be under the Direction and Control of the City Administrator or a designated representative. The response will be conducted from the EOC. The primary responders for terrorism are normally local law enforcement, fire and St. Louis County Health and Medical. All other departments are support. Pacific should prepare an SOG and functional checklist for response to a

terrorism incident. All participating agencies must comply with training requirements set forth by SEMA. In addition, an up-to-date list of emergency response personnel will be maintained and available. The following provides a breakdown by functional areas:

B. Assignment of Responsibilities:

1. EOC Function: (See Basic Plan and appropriate ESFs for additional information).

    a. The Federal Government is responsible for determining the threat level to the Nation. (See Appendix 1 to ESF#13-3 for HOMELAND SECURITY TERRORIST WARNING SYSTEM CHART.) However, it is up to the local jurisdiction to determine their appropriate threat level based upon their current situation.

    b. If notification of a terrorist incident is received, the Chief of Police will immediately contact the City Administrator and Primary and support agencies as identified in the P&S Charts.

    c. When notification of an incident is received, the individual receiving the notification will contact the Chief of Police and/or the City Administrator immediately.

    d. The Emergency Management Director is responsible for contacting the SEMA Staff Duty Officer to inform them of their current situation and threat. Other local departments will follow their respective SOG's for notifications.

    e. Activate the EOC at either the primary or alternate location. The EOC serves as the clearing house for local jurisdiction to collect, discuss, and disseminate information regarding a particular event occurring within their jurisdiction. The EOC is responsible for maintaining contact with appropriate State and Federal Agencies throughout the incident period.

    f. Review EOP and determine if pre-designated staging areas, mobilizations and reception centers are far enough away from the actual scene so that safety is guaranteed.

    g. If necessary, a Joint Operation Center (JOC) will be established by the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) and will be under the operational control of the Federal on Scene Commander (OSC). The JOC is the focal point and is responsible for coordinating requests from the State. The on Scene Commander may request that a representative from the impacted jurisdiction be assigned to the JOC.

2. Emergency Management:

    a. Direction and Control will originate from the EOC.

    b. Ensure alternate EOCs are operationally ready in the event that the primary EOC is not available.

    c. The EOC will be staffed in accordance with the Basic Plan.

d.   Coordinate with SEMA and other Federal, State or Local Agencies EOCs as necessary.

e.   Prepare and distribute Situations Reports (SITREPS).

f.   Coordinate response and recovery operations.

g.   Identify and coordinate resource requirements.

3.   Local Law Enforcement:

a.   Manage the incident scene. Set-up IMS to manage/coordinate with other departments and agencies using the Unified Command System.

b.   Respond to requests for support/assistance from other local, state and federal agencies.

c.   Provide security, maintain order, prevent unauthorized entry, control and re-route traffic and maintain open access/egress for authorized vehicles into the terrorist incident scene.

d.   Assist in evacuation/in place shelter notification of the affected area as requested by the EOC or the on-scene incident commander.

e.   Develop and maintain internal guidelines of duties, roles and responsibilities for any terrorism incidents involving CBRNE.

f.   Ensure scene security and evidence preservation pending arrival of the FBI and assist the FBI and other investigative authorities in determining responsibility.

g.   Establish access control into and out of crime scene.

h.   Provide security for Command Post and EOC.

i.   Manage crowd control when necessary.

4.   Fire Districts:

a.   Respond to all reports of terrorist incidents to determine the nature and scope of the incident.

b.   Provide a representative to the EOC and coordinate with the Police Department and other agencies for support and resource requirements.

c.   Establish site security areas and hazard exclusion zones in accordance with established procedures and guidelines.

d.   Determine the nature of the incident.

e.   Provide information on hazardous material/evaluation and environmental damage assessment.

f. Develop and maintain internal guidelines to identify specific roles and responsibilities of fire service personnel in each of the major terrorism incidents involving CBRNE.

5. Health Department:

   a. Provide personnel safety information to the EOC.

   b. Provide an environmental analysis, with help from the Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services and the Center for Disease Control and Prevention. Coordinate with The Counties Health Department Directors on all health issues. The Counties Health Department Director is responsible for determining the health risk and recommending epidemiological and toxicological solutions to deal with public health issues involved in a terrorist incident.

   c. Monitor response personnel and the general public's exposure to chemical, biological, and radiological agents.

   d. Monitor and track potential victims.

   e. Provide information regarding exposure and treatment to potential victims and workers.

   f. The Counties Health Department Director or a designated representative will assist the PIO on Health and Medical issues and in broadcasts concerning public and individual health issues.

   g. Keep the EOC informed.

6. Public Works:

   a. Respond to emergency requests from the EOC by providing trucks, earth moving equipment and other needed assets/materials along with operators to reduce hazards, minimizing secondary damage.

   b. Provide barricades to assist in evacuation and/or scene security.

   c. Assist in providing temporary storage of equipment and materials until appropriate locations can be located.

   d. Coordinate with the EOC and the on scene commander to insure the area is safe to enter. Do not enter any area if it has not been cleared and declared safe for reentry.

7. Emergency Medical Services.

   The Chief of Emergency Medical Service (EMS) is primarily responsible for directing the medical response and on scene operation within the impacted area. The EMS is responsible for identifying and anticipating resource requirements and allocation of resources. EMS coordinates mutual aid in conjunction with the St. Louis County Health Department.

V. DIRECTION AND CONTROL

A. Initial response operations are the responsibility of the City of Pacific. The FBI is the **Lead Federal Agency** for all terrorist attacks and will establish a JOC for Direction and Control if one is needed. The Missouri State Highway Patrol has primary responsibility for coordinating the state level response with the FBI.

B. Local Public Information Operations will be coordinated from the EOC.

Note: FEMA/FBI may establish a Joint Information Center (JIC).

C. Response and recovery operations are the responsibility of the local jurisdiction. Before making a formal request to SEMA for assistance, Pacific must exhaust its capabilities and resources.

VI. CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT

A. Line of Succession for Terrorism:

1. The Line of Succession for terrorism incidents in the City of Pacific will be dependent on the responding agency. The agencies likely to respond are the Police Department, the appropriate fire protection district, and/or The Counties Health Departments. Lines of succession for these agencies are shown in their respective ESF sections.

VII. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

A. Administration:

1. To implement this ESF, an incident must be designated a terrorist threat or action by the Mayor or his/her designee.

2. Procedures for dealing with expenses incurred and liability for actions and injuries are outlined in local ordinances, mutual aid agreements and this plan.

3. A post incident report and critique shall be the responsibility of the lead agencies with input from all involved agencies. This will be used for plan modifications and training exercises.

B. Logistics:

1. On hand stockpiles of critical essential materials and supplies should be inventoried and updated annually to insure their operational readiness or serviceability.

2. Emergency purchasing authority will be in effect if a terrorist incident has occurred.

3. The cleanup, removal and disposal of contaminated materials will be handled with the same care that was used during the incident. The Missouri Department of Natural Resources and the US Environmental Protection Agency may provide assistance in removal, disposal oversight, technical considerations, and funding.

C. St. Louis Area Regional Response System (STARRS):

1. The St. Louis Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack (CCTA) Program's Regional Response Guide has been developed for training purposes of applicable area agencies. The objectives of this guide are outlined below:

    a. Align jurisdictional strategies, plans, and tactics to enable regional coordination prior to, during, and after an active threat/CCTA

    b. Promote a unity of effort across jurisdictions to enable the development of a common operating picture and to maintain situational awareness

    c. Formalize ad-hoc or informal coordination mechanisms

    d. Integrate local, state, federal, and non-governmental resources, and services to support survivors (e.g., reunification, mental health support, hotlines, victim services)

    e. Include references to memorandums of understanding or agreements.

2. The City of Pacific is an active member of this organization.

Appendices

1. Homeland Security Advisory System
2. Homeland Security Response Teams and Forward Regional Response Teams
    a. Attachment A to Appendix 2 - HSRT and FRRT Team Structure
    b. Attachment B to Appendix 2 – Regional Response Teams Brochure
    c. Attachment C to Appendix 2 – CISA Complex Coordinated Attack Brochure
3. Response Isolation Distances
4. Chemical Emergency Notification Report

Appendix 1 to ESF#13-3

HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM

Because of the potential terrorist-related incidents, a national security alert system was developed to disseminate information regarding the risk of terrorist acts to federal, state, and local governments and to the American people.

The National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS) replaces the color-coded Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS). This new system will more effectively communicate information about terrorist threats by providing timely, detailed information to the public, government agencies, first responders, airports and other transportation hubs, and the private sector.

It recognizes that Americans all share responsibility for the nation's security and should always be aware of the heightened risk of terrorist attacks in the United States and what they should do.

NTAS Alert

After reviewing the available information, the Secretary of Homeland Security will decide, in coordination with other Federal entities, whether an NTAS Alert should be issued.

NTAS Alerts will only be issued when credible information is available.

These alerts will include a clear statement that there is an imminent threat or elevated threat. Using available information, the alerts will provide a concise summary of the potential threat, information about actions being taken to ensure public safety, and recommended steps that individuals, communities, businesses and governments can take to help prevent, mitigate or respond to the treat.

The NTAS Alerts will be based on nature of the threat: in some cases, alerts will be sent directly to law enforcement of affected areas of the private sector, while in others, alerts will be issued more broadly to American People through both official and media channels.

NTAS Alerts contain a sunset provision indicating a specific date when the alert expires – There will not be a constant NTAS Alert or blanket warning that there is an overarching threat. If threat information changes for an alert, the Secretary of Homeland Security may announce an updated NTAS Alert. All changes, including the announcement that cancels an NTAS Alert, will be distributed the same way as the original alert.

NOTE: The Chief of Police will determine the appropriate Threat Level based on the current situation and recommendations from SEMA.

Appendix 2 to ESF#13-3

HOMELAND SECURITY RESPONSE TEAMS AND

FORWARD REGIONAL RESPONSE TEAMS

Homeland Security and Forward Regional Response Teams (HSRT and FRRT) were developed and trained locally. SEMA is the coordinating agency for the Department of Justice – Equipment Program which provided grant funds to the State to purchase protective equipment, decontamination equipment, detection equipment and communications equipment for designated Fire/ Hazmat, EMS and Law Enforcement agencies statewide. The program is designed to assist communities in the development of a local WMD response capability identified in the three – year Statewide Domestic Preparedness Strategy. Participation in the program is based upon several criteria including existing HAZMAT team capability, desire and willingness to participate. Any future expansion will be based upon the results of the statewide Homeland Security Assessment and Strategy Program.

The HSRT is a more robust team, which generally enjoys some capabilities beyond what would normally be found in a FRRT. For example, some HSRTs have an urban search and rescue capability and will in most cases, have been involved in the grant program for longer period of time than a typical FRRT. HSRTs typically have a more sophisticated detection capability and greater decontamination capacity than a FRRT. Of the total HRSTs and FRRTs in the state, the vast majority are HSRTs.

HSRTs and FRRTs are designed to operate on a regional basis and the aim is to have at least one team no more than 50 miles from any location in the State. Teams will be directed to respond to terrorist or suspected terrorist incidents by SEMA and the cost of deploying the teams will be absorbed by the State, provided the Governor declares a state of emergency. All of these teams are also capable of responding to a Hazardous Material or HAZMAT incident through the fire mutual aid provisions of Revised Missouri Statutes, Chapter 44. In the event that a HAZMAT response is provided as described above, the funding support would be in accordance with existing mutual aid agreements.

Training levels, equipment and technology are constantly being improved to add an even more robust capability to respond to a terrorist incident or accident involving hazardous materials. Additional information regarding availability of training, status or management of grants, general equipment lists common to all teams is available through the Operations Branch of SEMA or through the SEMA web page.

Attachment A to Appendix 2 to ESF#13-3

HSRT & FRRT Team Structure

<u>Homeland Security Response Team (HSRT)</u> – Trained equipped, full capable HAZMAT Team recognized by the State Fire Marshal's office for day-to-day HAZMAT operations and includes:

- HAZMAT Personnel
- Emergency Medical Service Personnel
- Law Enforcement Personnel

<u>Forward Regional Response Team (FRRT)</u> – Responsible for coordinating emergency preparedness and response to oil and hazardous substance pollution incidents. There are 13 Regional Response Teams (RRTs), one for each of ten federal regions, plus one for Alaska, one for the Caribbean, and one for the Pacific Basin. Each RRT maintains a Regional Contingency Plan (RCP) and has state, as well as federal government, representation. MO is within Region VII.

APPENDIX #3 to ESF#13-3

PRODUCT	ISOLATE DISTANCE		ISOLATE DISTANCE	
	Small Incident	Large Incident	Small Incident	Large Incident
			Fire / No Fire	Fire/ No Fire
Biological	300'	300'	300'/ 300'	
Nuclear	80-160'	80-160'	1000'/ 330'	
Incendiary	330-660'	330-660'	2640'/ 1000'	
Irritants	80-160'	80-160'	330'/ 2640'	330'/ 2640'
			Day/Night	**Day/Night**
Nerve Agents	700'	2000'	1.2m/ 5.5m	4.6m/ 7 m
Blister Agents	700'	2000'	1.2m/ 5.5m	4.6m/ 7m
Lewisite	700'	2000'	1.2m/ 5.5m	4.6m/ 7m
Blood Agents	200-600'	200-600'	.1m/ .5m	.4m/ 1.7m
Chocking Agents	400-1000'	400-1100'	.4m/ 1.7m	1.4m/ 6.2m
Irritants	80-160'	80-160'	330'/ 330'	330'/ 330'

RESPONSE ISOLATION DISTANCES

APPENDIX #4 TO ESF#13-3
CHEMICAL EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION REPORT

Date: _____ Time: _____ Rec'd by: _____

1. Caller Name _____ Representing _____

2. Call-back #s _____Emergency contact _____

3. Material(s) Released _____ EHS yes/no

4. Amount Released _____ lbs./gals Potential release_____

5. Date of Release _____ Time_____ Duration _____hr. _____min

6. Release Medium: Air _____ Water_____ Soil _____ Sewer _____ Drains_____

7. Location: City or County _____

8. Health Risks _____

9. Precautions (Public Safety Concerns) _____

_____

10. Incident Description: Fire _____ Gas Vapor _____ Spill _____ Explosion _____

    Other_____

11. Type of container: Truck _____ RRCar _____ Drum _____

12. 4-Digit ID #. _____ Placard/ Label info _____

13. Weather Conditions _____ Wind Direction _____ Temp. _____F

14. Agencies Notified:

    Local Fire…………………… _____yes _____no _____time
    Local Emergency Director….. _____yes _____no _____time
    Mo DNR 573-634-2436…….. _____yes _____no _____time
    National Response Ctr……….. _____yes _____no _____time
       1-800-424-8802
    CHEMTREC 800-424-8802…. _____yes _____no _____time
    Other_____……….. _____yes _____no _____time

15. Remarks, etc. (Injuries) _____

_____

REGIONAL RESPONSE TEAMS

REGIONAL RESPONSE TEAMS (RRT) ARE MULTI-AGENCY COORDINATING GROUPS WHO ARE KEY PARTNERS IN ENSURING EFFECTIVE PLANNING, PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE TO OIL AND CHEMICAL INCIDENTS AFFECTING HUMAN HEALTH AND SAFETY, AS WELL AS THE ENVIRONMENT.

RRTs ensure coordinated, efficient, and effective support of federal, state, tribal and local responders to significant oil and hazardous substance incidents within a particular geographic region of the United States. RRTs are an intergovernmental forum that strengthen oil and hazardous substance planning, and build relationships among responders through the following activities:

- Develop Regional Contingency Plans (RCPs);
- Coordinate regional oil and chemical incident preparedness activities;
- Coordinate assistance and advice to the Federal On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) and state and local partners during response actions;
- Conduct and participate in training and exercises;
- Serve as a resource to Area Committees, State Emergency Response Commissions (SERCs) and Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs); and
- Participate in planning and coordination activities along borders shared with other RRTs or other nations (i.e., Canada, Mexico, and Arctic Nations).

Membership

There are 13 RRTs, each representing a particular geographic region (including Alaska, the Caribbean, and Oceania). **RRTs' membership** is composed of representatives from:

- Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
- U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)
- Department of Agriculture (USDA)
- Department of Defense (DOD)
- Department of Commerce/National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (DOC/NOAA)
- Department of Energy (DOE)
- Department of the Interior (DOI)
- Department of Justice (DOJ)
- Department of Labor/Occupational Safety and Health Administration (DOL/OSHA)
- Department of State (DOS)
- Department of Transportation (DOT)
- Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
- General Services Administration (GSA)
- Health and Human Services (HHS)
- Nuclear Regulatory Commission (US NRC)
- State, territorial/tribal, and local representatives

ALASKA

OCEANIA
Hawaii
Guam
Northern Marianas
American Samoa

CARIBBEAN
Puerto Rico
U.S. Virgin Islands

Representatives from industry, environmental organizations, and civic groups may also participate in public RRT meetings and activities.

Function

RRTs function in two ways: as a standing team and as an incident-specific team.

Standing RRTs participate in planning, preparedness, and training year-round, and are co-chaired by the EPA and the USCG. Standing RRTs may establish collaborative working groups and assign work as deemed appropriate, such as committees, workgroups or task forces.

Incident-Specific RRTs provide assistance to Federal OSCs and responding agencies during an incident. Activation of an incident-specific RRT usually occurs at the request of a Federal OSC. Standing RRTs can also activate an incident-specific RRT if it is evident that the Federal OSC needs additional support, or a discharge transects state boundaries, may pose a substantial threat to the public or environment, or is a worst-case discharge. An incident-specific RRT is chaired by the federal agency providing the Federal OSC.

Responsibilities

As outlined in 40 CFR 300.115 of the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP), the four major responsibilities of the RRTs are Planning, Response, Training, and Coordination.

1. PLANNING

Under the NCP, planning is divided into national, regional, area, state, local, tribal, and industry (vessel and facility) levels. Each level requires the development of a plan consistent with higher level plans. Statutes, regulations and plans at the local, state, tribal, regional, and national levels integrate federal, state, local, and tribal governments, and industry under a common mission.

PLANS	PLANNING GROUPS
National Contingency Plan	National Response Team
Regional Contingency Plans	Regional Response Teams
Area Contingency Plans	Area Committees
State Contingency Plans	States/SERCs
Local/LEPC Plans	Local/LEPCS
Industry Plans	Industry

Section 300.210 (b) of the NCP requires standing RRTs to develop RCPs to ensure that the roles and responsibilities of federal, state, local, and other organizations at an incident are clearly defined in advance. RCPs also outline when an incident-specific RRT should be activated, and the role of the RRT in supporting the Federal OSC. RCPs also delineate the inland and coastal zones upon which the EPA and the USCG have agreed. Following an incident, the standing RRT may request and review the Federal OSC's report to identify areas for improvement to Area Contingency Plans (ACPs) and RCPs.

The geographic region covered by an RRT can be divided into subareas based on considerations such as ecosystem, topography, or risk/threat considerations in the inland zone, or USCG Captain of the Port zones in the coastal zone. Area Committees, composed of federal, state, and local agency representatives, develop ACPs to support regional planning efforts to clearly define roles, hazards and response strategies prior to an incident. Standing RRTs may review ACPs and provide feedback and guidance. If conducted, the review ensures that the RRT member agencies' resources and issues are addressed, and provides consistency of individual ACPs with the RCP and the NCP. In addition, RRTs and Area Committees authorize the use of appropriate oil spill control agents listed on the NCP Product Schedule.

2. RESPONSE

While called a "response team," incident-specific RRTs do not deploy as a team to the incident, but member organizations reach back into their organizations to access resources and obtain technical advice needed by the OSC. RRTs provide technical advice, equipment, or manpower to assist Federal OSCs, federal agencies and state agencies with incident response. Incident-specific RRTs coordinate the decision-making processes for certain response strategies, including chemical countermeasures and in-situ burn. RRTs also provide a forum for federal and state agencies to exchange information about their abilities to assist Federal OSCs.

3. TRAINING

Training and exercises are implemented to enhance and test the ability of response agencies to execute plans and coordinate during a simulated event. An RRT may analyze exercise lessons learned of regional, area, and/or local plans to identify gaps or overlaps that require additional attention in an RCP or, as appropriate, other plans. Joint training provides a forum for planning and response partners to increase understanding and coordination among organizations.

4. COORDINATION

Standing and incident-specific RRTs promote awareness of and identify available resources from each federal agency and state within their regions. These resources include equipment, guidance, training and technical expertise for dealing with chemical releases or oil spills. If additional resources are required, the RRT can contact federal or state authorities to request assistance. This coordination by the RRTs ensures that resources are properly distributed and that no region is lacking what it needs to protect human health and the environment.

THE OIL RESPONSE LANDSCAPE

- OVER 15,800 OIL SPILLS IN FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2018*

- OVER 140,000 MILES OF RAIL, TRANSPORTING OVER 476,000 BARRELS PER DAY

- OVER 2,000 OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OFFSHORE FACILITIES, ACCOUNTING FOR 18% OF U.S. CRUDE PRODUCTION

- OVER 10,000,000 BARRELS OF CRUDE OIL IMPORTED DAILY OVER 6,000,000 BARRELS OF CRUDE OIL EXPORTED DAILY

*Reports to the National Response Center (NRC) in FY18

THE HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES RESPONSE LANDSCAPE

- ROUGHLY 7,500 REPORTED RELEASES IN FY 2018*

- AN ESTIMATED 3,800 AGRICULTURE FACILITIES

- ROUGHLY 1,800 CHEMICAL MANUFACTURING FACILITIES

- MORE THAN 1,700 ENERGY FACILITIES

- AN ESTIMATED 1,800 WATER AND WASTEWATER FACILITIES

- MORE THAN 2,500 FOOD AND BEVERAGE FACILITIES

*Reports of "non-oil" releases reported to the NRC in FY18

National Response System

RRTs are part of a larger planning and response system known as the National Response System (NRS). The NRS ensures that oil and hazardous substance planning and response are effectively managed through its network of interagency, intergovernmental and private sector relationships and plans, providing federal resources to support state, local and tribal activities. The NRS is detailed in the NCP, 40 CFR part 300.

Additional Information

For more information about your RRT, please visit www.nrt.org > RRTs.

For more information about the NRS, please visit www.nrt.org > About NRT.

Complex Coordinated Attacks
Security Awareness for Soft Targets and Crowded Places

A Complex Coordinated Attack (CCA), also known as a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack, is a violent assault or series of assaults by one or more individuals or groups using one or more type of weapons with the intent to inflict harm on large numbers of people. While these type of attacks often result from various motives including terrorist ideology, the continued proliferation of CCAs overseas and domestically demonstrates that CCAs remain a concern for the conceivable future.

Potential Indicators

Complex coordinated attacks are an evolving and dynamic threat, shifting from symbolic, well-planned attacks on high-visibility targets to attacks that are more dispersed and difficult to detect. Like other attack vectors, specific behaviors or circumstances may be observed in perpetrators before a CCA occurs. These potential indicators may include, but are not limited to:

- Attempting to elicit information regarding a facility or building's purpose, operations, security procedures that is beyond mere curiosity and potentially suspicious.

- Unattended or unauthorized vehicles in unusual or restricted areas.

- Overt testing of security measures or emergency response.

- Procurement or purchase of unusual quantities of possible improvised explosive device (IED) materials, such as cellphones, pagers, or timers, and/or explosive precursors, such as fertilizers, fuels, or acids.

- Unauthorized personnel attempting to enter or actually entering a restricted area or protected site through impersonation of authorized personnel (e.g., police/security, janitor).

- Seeking additional access to or encountered within restricted or controlled areas.

- Misrepresent one's affiliation to cover possible illicit activity by presenting false documentation, identification, or insignia.

- Taking photos or videos of facilities, buildings, or infrastructure's seldomly used access points; personnel performing security functions (patrols, badge/vehicle checking); or security-related equipment (perimeter fencing, security cameras).

FACTS & EVENTS

The occurrence of CCAs have increased in recent years around the world, including several notable incidents:

- In April 2019, three churches, three luxury hotels, a housing complex, and a guest house in and around Colombo, Sri Lanka were targeted in a coordinated suicide bombing attack. These attacks killed 259 people and at least 500 were wounded.

- In August 2017, attackers in Barcelona, Spain drove vehicles into pedestrians and stabbed bystanders while attempting to escape, killing 16 people and injuring more than 130 others.

- In March 2016, suicide bombers detonated three devices in Brussels, Belgium, two at Zaventem International Airport and one at the Maelbeek Metro Station. The blasts killed 32 people and injured more than 330.

- On April 15, 2013, two brothers perpetrated an attack on people in the crowds during the annual Boston Marathon using a couple of homemade pressure cooker bombs detonated 12 seconds and 210 yards apart, near the finish line of the race. The attack, with retribution for US military action in Afghanistan and Iraq as motive, killed three people and injured several hundred patrons.

- On July 20, 2012, a mass shooting occurred inside a movie theater in Aurora, Colorado, during a midnight screening of a film. The perpetrator set off tear gas grenades and shot into the audience with multiple firearms. The attack killed 12 and wounded 70 patrons. The day following the attack, police, bomb squads and federal agents found a large number of explosive devices and trip wires at the perpetrators apartment.

Adversarial Tactics and Techniques

Attackers may employ the following tactics, which differentiate a CCA from other types of incidents:

- Use of well-armed, well-trained individuals in small teams employing military or law enforcement style tactics;

- Strike multiple targets simultaneously or in close succession;

- Strike quickly and move to another location before law enforcement can interdict and disrupt;

- Delay or deny entry and exit to victims and first responders by blocking exits and/or chaining/rigging doors with explosives, using tear gas, and/or using fire/smoke to delay law enforcement response efforts and potentially prolong the incident;

- Deploy diversions to slow public safety response, consume responder resources, or draw responders toward or away from specific locations;

- Coordinate timing and methods (e.g., firearms, improvised explosive devices, hazardous materials) with other attackers and accomplices providing assistance to the attackers; and

- Conduct secondary attacks on first responders, evacuation routes, and/or additional sites, such as medical facilities, that are part of the response.

Mitigation Strategies and Protective Measures

Implementing comprehensive planning and preparedness considerations into an organization's security practices are key to saving lives while defending against a potential CCA. The majority of the below protective actions are options for consideration when developing emergency action plans and equipping personnel to execute those plans.

Prevention/Planning

- Apply layered security concepts (physical, procedural, intelligence) to recognize and manage threats early.
- Expect a potentially significant delay in help arriving as first responders will be overwhelmed during a CCA.
- Review existing plans to see if current actions may put people at increased risk for secondary attacks.
- Address how to implement support plans for survivors and families of the deceased.
- Ensure plans Include how to provide mental health assistance and support in recovery support efforts.

Training/Equipping

- Ensure that personnel are comfortable with emergency procedures to ensure proper implementation.
- Train personnel to recognize and report suspicious behavior.
- Train personnel for self and buddy-care to mitigate delayed first response.
- Equip shelter and safe-haven areas with medical supplies, food, and water for an extended period of time.

Additional Resources for Owners and Operators

For direct regional support, visit www.dhs.gov/hometown-security.

For additional resources, products, and information regarding the security of soft targets and crowded places, visit www.dhs.gov/securing-soft-targets-and-crowded-places.

For additional resources, products, and information regarding active shooter preparedness, visit www.dhs.gov/active-shooter-preparedness.

For additional Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack resources, training, and FEMA grant information, visit www.fema.gov.

For life saving response training, visit www.dhs.gov/stopthebleed.